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1Abstract
Over the last few years, Europeanisation has become increasingly popular in the literature on European 
integration. In most of these studies, Europeanisation is defi ned as the domestic impact of EU 
regulation. This paper will follow that ʻmainstream  ʼconceptualisation, by focusing on the top down 
effect. Whereas most attention has been paid to changes in national policy, due to a ʻmisfi t  ʼwith EU 
regulation, this paper considers the effect on politics, in particular party programmes. The most recent 
election programmes of the main parties in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom are analysed, based 
on a threefold categorisation of references to the EU. These categories include the institutionalisation of 
the EU, the division of competences between the national and the EU level, and the penetration of EU 
policy into national politics. The results show that parties tend to focus on EU policy and institutions, 
whilst paying little attention to the impact of Europe and the limits set to national party agendas. 
Moreover, there is a clear difference in the way in which Europe has become an integral part of the party 
programme. Finally, the paper offers two suggestions for further research. First, to see to what extent 
party positions on the EU have an effect on policy competition and electoral competition. Second, to 
expand the research on EU and parties, by including the impact on party organisational aspects.   
This paper draws on earlier papers presented at the Annual Meeting of the Dutch Political Science 
Association, Dordrecht, 23-24 May 2003 and at the 2nd ECPR General Conference, Marburg, 18-21 
September 2003. I would like to thank the conference participants, in particular Martine van Assche 
and Peter Mair, and the referee of this working paper series for helpful comments. 
11. Introduction
Over the last ten years, Europeanisation has obtained a prominent place in the literature on 
European integration. This increasing popularity is not entirely unproblematic, as can be seen 
in the variety of defi nitions and conceptualisations that exist. In this paper, I will not dwell 
on this painstaking discussion,  although I cannot entirely ignore the issue. For the sake of 
clarity, I will present a rather limited and strict notion of Europeanisation. The core of this 
paper will be the empirical evidence that links European integration and party programmes. 
This paper proceeds as follows: fi rst, I will discuss the main arguments and problems of the 
Europeanisation literature. The central message will be that the term Europeanisation should 
be reserved for the EU impact at the domestic level. Second, I will describe how EU and 
parties can be linked, and how this has been done in the literature so far. Although it is incorrect 
to state that this link has been ignored in the academic debate, very little of this specifi cally 
involves Europeanisation. The third and fi nal issue will be to analyse how parties are affected 
by Europeanisation and how this fi ts in the general debate on the effects of Europe, or, to be 
more precise, the so-called top down approach (cf. Börzel 2001). 
A quick view on the literature shows that most of the rapidly expanding research 
on Europeanisation has focused on policy change, arguably the area in which the effect of 
European integration has been most profound (cf. Héritier 2001). As a result, changes in 
national politics have been somewhat neglected. One of the reasons may be that the EU seems 
to have little effect in this area. This paper seeks to fi ll part of that gap. In particular, I will try to 
show which effects of European integration on political parties can be discerned. The specifi c 
application will be a comparative analysis of the most recent election programmes of the main 
political parties in the Netherlands and the UK.
2. Europeanisation
EU studies have been marked by a shift in the focus of research: from the classic issue of 
integration to polity-building or institutionalisation. One of the upshots of this change has been 
the growing attention for Europeanisation, i.e. analysing the effects of Europe on national 
politics and policy-making instead of studying how national politics determine the process of 
European integration (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2000; Radaelli 2000; Cowles et al. 2001; Olsen 
2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). 
According to Haverland (2003), this Europeanisation research can be divided into 
three phases. In the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, we fi nd a number of - rather idiosyncratic - 
implementation studies, which were mostly a-theoretical. Moreover, the emphasis was on the 
EC as a dependent variable. In the second phase, from the mid-1990s on, Europeanisation 
studies became more comparative and theoretically informed, and the term Europeanisation 
was more generally used. The diverging outcomes in different countries and in different 
policy areas led to several hypotheses about the effect of Europe. Most prominently among 
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these is the ʻgoodness of fi t  ʼhypothesis: the misfi t between EU rules and national policy leads 
to adaptational pressure. Much of this literature is based on a (neo-) institutionalist logic, in 
which existing national arrangements explain why the effects of Europe are dissimilar. Finally, 
in the third phase - which is the current agenda - we fi nd studies that are guided by theoretical 
assumptions: from induction to deduction. In contrast to much of the earlier work, which was 
somewhat isolated, several authors explicitly incorporate insights from International Relations 
and Comparative Politics in their research and try to test alternative hypotheses. The search for 
logics or mechanisms of (domestic) change has become a central issue. As Börzel and Risse 
(2003: 60) state: 
ʻThe issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, 
at what pace, and at what point of time.  ʼ(my italics)
In other words, it is taken for granted that Europe has an impact on the politics, policy 
and polity of national states. The main question becomes how to link developments at the 
European and the national level. Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002) distinguish three mechanisms - 
positive integration, negative integration and framing - which all have their impact on the scope 
and direction of domestic change. Cowles et al. (2001) and Börzel and Risse (2003) build on 
the idea of a ʻmisfi t  ʼbetween European regulation and existing national practices, which forms 
a pressure for change. All of these accounts are based on a neo-institutionalist logic, which 
claims that the national context - institutions and actors - matters. As a result, Europeanisation 
will not be the same in all countries; therefore it cannot be equated with harmonisation or 
convergence.
One matter still very much unresolved concerns the defi nition of Europeanisation. 
In a recent overview article, Harmsen and Wilson (2000) list as much as eight different 
conceptualisations:  1) new forms of European governance, 2) national adaptation, 3) policy 
isomorphism, 4) problem and opportunity for domestic political management, 5) modernisation, 
6) ʻ joining Europeʼ, 7) reconstruction of identities, 8) transnationalism and cultural integration. 
Other overview articles, like Radaelli (2000), Olsen (2001), Blair (2002) and Featherstone 
(2003) present a similar picture of a fuzzy, ill-determined concept. It is worthy of note that 
despite several years of conceptualising and reformulating, there is no common defi nition 
agreed upon (yet). As a matter fact, many would consider the original defi nition of Ladrech 
(1994: 69) still very useful:  
“…an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and 
policy-making”
Despite these conceptual problems, Europeanisation enjoys an increasing popularity and the 
literature is booming. Almost every article dealing with this subject will contain the inevitable 
remarks on ʻ a recent shift in the literature  ʼfrom the bottom-up perspective (intergovernmentalism 
vs. neo-functionalism) to the top-down perspective. Or, put in a different way: the EU as a 
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dependent variable or explanandum which has become the independent variable or explanans 
(Jachtenfuchs 2001)1. Moreover, most authors will point at the similarity with the debate in IR 
known as the ʻsecond image reversed  ʼ(Gourevitch 1978; cf. Vink 2003).
In this paper, I will follow the ʻmainstream  ʼunderstanding of Europeanisation. This 
implies that Europeanisation is located at the domestic level: the top-down effect. Although I 
acknowledge that there is a bottom-up process going on as well - which might be important to 
understand the ʻshaping  ʼand the ʻtaking  ʼ- I would not call this Europeanisation. Looking at 
how national preferences collide and coincide at the European level falls within the traditional 
European integration debate. To me, Europeanisation should be an intentional isolation of a 
certain aspect of EU policy making, namely its domestic impact. 
3. EU and parties
Even a quick scrutiny of the recent Europeanisation literature already shows that an 
overwhelming amount of studies has focused on policy change (an overview can be found 
in Börzel and Risse 2003). Having said that, it would defi nitely be incorrect to argue that the 
link between EU and politics or parties has been completely neglected. An edited volume by 
Gaffney (1996) looked at the positions of several national parties on European integration, and 
the difference between party families and countries in this respect. In addition, several case 
studies have focused on the way in which various parties have positioned themselves vis-à-vis 
European integration (e.g. Cole 2001; Heffernan 2001). A lot of stimulating work has been 
done by a group of scholars around Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (Marks and Wilson 1999; 
Ray 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe et al. 2002; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks
et al. 2002). These authors try to explain party positions on European issues with the help of 
existing patterns of competition. Explanatory variables included are left-right positioning, 
traditional/authoritarian vs. post-materialist/libertarian politics and domestic cleavages. 
Bartolini (1999) argues that European integration is challenging the dominant role of 
parties in channelling the demands and interests of citizens. In Bartoliniʼs view, three channels 
of representation have traditionally existed: territorial, corporatist and politico-electoral. 
Over time, the latter form has become dominant over the other two, or, to put it differently: 
the politico-electoral channel (parties!) has incorporated the two former. What European 
integration does, is to challenge this dominance of the politico-electoral channel. Even more, it 
implicates a renewal of both corporatist and territorial representation. Parties have not attained 
the same dominant position in European decision making as they have at the national level. As 
a consequence, the role of parties is limited and they are able to perform their linkage function 
to a limited extent only.
Considering the understanding of Europeanisation outlined in the previous section, 
these studies do not qualify as Europeanisation however2. The fi rst group of literature examines 
the impact of existing (national) patterns of competition on EU positions, instead of the effect 
of EU policy on national party positions. The other group of literature concerns itself with 
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the role of parties at the European level, sometimes including a comparison with the role of 
national parties. It seems important to separate the topic ʻEuropeanisation and parties  ʼfrom the 
broader literature which links EU and parties. Therefore, I now turn to those authors that have 
worked within that particular focus.
Mair (2000) has examined the impact of European integration on national party 
systems, looking at two basic features: format (number of relevant parties) and mechanics
(interaction of parties). When it comes to the format, he fi nds a growing fragmentation in many 
party systems. More than 140 new political parties emerged to contest domestic elections. But 
these developments cannot be linked directly to European integration. Also, the mechanics of 
the party system have not changed very much. Considering the electoral success of pro- and 
anti-Europe parties, Mair fi nds that the anti-Europe bloc does not perform too well. Moreover, 
those parties that do gain substantial levels of support, often ʻhave other powerful string to 
their bowsʼ. However, he does suggest an indirect effect: the hollowing out of the competition 
between parties with governing aspiration, and the depoliticisation of the European issue:
ʻ… European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of movement of national 
governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of competition among those parties with a 
governing aspiration. As such, it promotes a degree of consensus across the mainstream and an 
inevitable reduction in the range of policy alternatives available to voters.  ʼ(Mair 2000: 48-9)
This probably is one of the main challenges for the EU-cum-parties literature: which is the 
effect of EU integration on party competition? First, to see to what extent the transfer of policy 
making to the EU level indeed limits parties in their programmes and second, whether the EU 
issue becomes politicised or is ʻtaken out  ʼof competition? 
The most extensive and sophisticated attempt to link EU and parties has been made by 
Ladrech, who suggests a research agenda for the study of Europeanisation and political parties, 
consisting of fi ve dimensions (2002):
1. policy change: an increased mention of EU policy and domestic policy areas where 
Europe has its infl uence, together with an emphasis on the possibilities of co-operation 
with transnational organisations
2. organisational change: change of party rules and statutes to arrange the role of the 
European delegation within the national party; besides, the relations with the European 
federations to which a party belongs
3. party competition: politicisation of the European issue; new parties that emerge based 
largely on their pro- or anti-EU position, and the way in which existing parties use 
Europe in their (electoral) strategy
4. party-government relations: due to participation of cabinet ministers in EU forums, the 
relation with the party basis may become strained; parties will ʻpush  ʼfor a position that 
is close to their programme and at the same time ʻpull  ʼto keep policy areas in national 
hands
5. relations beyond the party system: transnational activities, co-operation with other 
parties from the same federation may be enhanced; emergence of a form of transnational 
party organisation
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These changes will affect both the relations between voters and parties – mobilisation, 
electoral success, articulation and integration of interests – and between parties – ideologies, 
programmes and platforms, government formation. True, few voters seem to judge parties on 
their view on enhancing the powers of the European Parliament or the need for a common 
defence and security policy. But there are signs that voters are no longer indifferent about the 
EU policy of political parties. 
In the remainder of this paper, I will single out two of these dimensions: policy change, 
the fi rst item of Ladrechʼs listing, and I will take up the third issue - party competition - in the 
concluding section. Policy proposals, put forward in electoral manifestos, can be considered as 
defi ning characteristics of a party. Voters form their opinion about parties mostly on the basis 
of these programmes; moreover, programmes play a crucial role in the competition with other 
parties. If EU integration would indeed lead to policy change (refl ected in change of the party 
programmes), this might have important implications. 
I have chosen to compare two countries, which show clear differences in terms of public 
opinion about Europe. The Netherlands, which has traditionally been a Europhile country, and 
the United Kingdom, where public opinion displays outspoken Euroscepticism. Assuming that 
parties are – to some extent – responsive to voter preferences, we would expect a larger impact 
of EU integration in the case of the United Kingdom. First, because playing the European card 
could be electorally rewarding, second because parties will be forced to be more specifi c in 
their ideas about the EU. In the Netherlands, we would expect a lower salience of the EU issue 
and perhaps less outspoken visions on the EU too. 
The guiding question for the empirical sections will be: to what extent do we 
witness the impact of European integration in the programmes of the main parties in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom? This impact should be visible in the fact that 
ʻEC political and economic dynamics  ʼhave become part of the logic of national parties (cf. 
defi nition on page 4). Are parties aware of the EU context in which they have to formulate their 
desired policies? The effect of Europe on parties is not generally framed in terms of ʻmisfi t  ʼor 
ʻgoodness of fi t  ʼwhich is of central importance in most of the other Europeanisation literature. 
Although it can be argued that a certain misfi t exists between EU policy and national party 
agendaʼs, there is no formal requirement for parties to adapt. In other words, the way in which 
parties deal with Europeanisation is of a far more voluntary nature. The supposed misfi t does 
not necessarily function as a trigger for change. Below I will attempt to capture the logic at 
work in the relation between European integration and party politics.
4. Method and cases
Those who are familiar with the work of the Manifesto Research Group (Budge and Farlie 
1983; Budge et al. 2001), and in particular with the coding scheme that is used, will understand 
that these data are not very adequate for the question I wish to address in this paper. From a 
total of 56 categories, only 2 deal with Europe: one scores positive references to the EU, the 
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other scores negative references. This will only give a very general picture of party positions. 
Certain authors have sought to repair this defi cit, by developing their own coding schemes for 
European manifestos (Hix 1999). Another attempt has been made by a research team steered 
by the University of Mannheim3. However, for the purpose of my analysis these coding 
categories are again too detailed. In other words, I have to fi nd a position somewhere between 
the very rough indicators of pro- and anti-Europe4 and the many empty cells I would end up 
with in a sophisticated coding. After all, we are talking national programmes, which parties use 
to contest national elections. Although these programmes surely cannot (and do not) ignore 
Europe, they will probably not give a very detailed and extensive vision on the EU, for which 
they have a European platform. 
My categorisation consists of three types of Europeanisation that I expect to fi nd in 
national programmes. I have distinguished three categories: 1) policy and institutions, 2) 
transfer of decision making, and 3) opportunities and constraints. The fi rst category includes 
those references that deal with the EU level, i.e. both the desired EU policy and the role of the 
Commission, Parliament and Council. The second category alludes to the interplay between 
the national and the EU level: which is the proper level for which area? In this debate, the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality will often occur, as well as the quest for a 
Kompetenzkatalog, which would make clear what is to be European policy and what is not. 
Finally,  ʻopportunities and constraints  ʼdeals with the effects of Europe at the national level. 
When the EU is gaining policy making authority, the autonomy and infl uence of national 
governments decrease. As a result, parties at the national level will have to be more ʻmodest  ʼ
in what they offer in their programmes. In certain areas, they can only present solutions that 
are conditional upon the co-operation of other countries and their respective governments. On 
the other hand, EU regulation may also be benefi cial for certain parties, when it fi ts in the party 
ideology (and consequently can be used for domestic competition). Table 1 summarises these 
three types of reference and illustrates them through citations from various party programmes. 
Table 1. References to the EU in party programmes
Question Example
Policy and 
institutions 
Which ideas does a party have about  EU 
policy and the architecture of the EU 
political system?
ʻD66 wants a directly elected president of the 
European Commission.  ʼ(Netherlands 2002, D66)
Transfer of 
policy making 
Which issues should be tackled at the 
European level, and which at the national 
level?
ʻThe EU should focus its policy-making only 
on those area for which EU-wide action is 
indispensable.  ʼ(United Kingdom 2001, LDP)  
Opportunities 
and constraints
To what extent does EU policy limit 
parties in their policy choices and to what 
extent does it offer new chances?
ʻThe health care system has to be in agreement 
with the European principle of free movement and 
freedom of choice  ʼ(Netherlands 2002, CDA)
To be sure, these categories should not be seen as specifi c issues which will be coded, analogous 
to the examples cited above. Rather, they serve as stepping-stones for interpreting the references 
to Europe in the manifestos. In my view, one of the advantages of using these three categories is 
that they comprise different forms of Europeanisation distinguished in the literature. First, the 
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notion of rules, norms and practices developed at the European level, which is the way Cowles 
et al. (2001) interpret Europeanisation. The second type refers to the division of competences 
between member states and the EU, and includes the possible transfer of policy areas to the 
European level. This is in line with the understanding of Europeanisation as transnational co-
operation or as new forms of governance (cf. Harmsen and Wilson 2000). Finally, the impact 
of European rules at the national level fi ts very well with the idea of a domestic reaction to EU 
integration, which is the most common understanding of Europeanisation (cf. Vink 2003).
In addition, the three types also follow Mair (2002), who sees Europeanisation as 
involving two elements: penetration of European regulation into domestic arrangements (type 
3) and institutionalisation (type 1) of an EU political system (type 2 is the interface between 
the two). Both types of Europeanisation create patterns of confl ict and opposition; in the 
former case, it is about the scope of European infl uence, in the latter case the structure of the 
European political system itself is concerned. In the next sections I will examine to what extent 
the three types of reference can be found in the party programmes of the main political parties 
in the Netherlands (2002) and the United Kingdom (2001).
5. How the EU affects parties 
Obviously, the fi rst place to look for mentions of Europe, is the ʻEuropean  ʼor ʻinternational  ʼ
section of the party programme. By now, every party includes such a section in its manifesto. 
But this is certainly not the only place where references to the EU can be found. It turned out 
that the other sections of the manifesto also contain quite some European content. My focus 
is on the impact of European integration on party programmes. That is, how much attention 
do parties pay to the European issue and how do they relate to Europe? Can we see clear 
differences between parties that give Europe a prominent place in their programme and other 
parties that more or less ignore the issue? Is there a clear difference between Euro-enthusiasts 
and Euro-sceptics? Table 2 gives a brief overview of party positions on Europe. The scores 
for ʻposition  ʼcan vary from 1 - strongly opposed to European integration, to 7 - strongly in 
favour of European integration. Concerning salience: this scale ranges from 1 - no importance, 
never mentioned by the party, to 5- the most important issue for the party. I will not discuss 
these fi gures in detail, since this has already been done in Ray (1999) and Hooghe et al. (2002). 
Rather, my aim is to give a short impression of where parties stand and how important the 
European issue is to them. This serves as a prelude to the analysis below.
8 9
Table 2. Party position and salience of EU issue
1984 1992 1999 1984 1992 1999
Position Salience
U
ni
te
d 
K
in
go
dm
LAB 4.50 6.00 5.38 2.75 3.25 3.08
TORY 3.38 3.88 2.15 3.00 3.63 3.75
LDP 6.63 6.63 6.62 3.50 3.38 3.64
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
PvdA 5.78 5.67 6.55 2.22 2.56 2.82
VVD 6.11 5.44 5.45 2.44 2.89 3.00
CDA 6.44 6.44 6.45 2.67 2.89 2.91
D66 6.44 6.33 6.64 2.22 2.33 2.73
Source: Data set Gary Marks and Marco Steenbergen, available at http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks
In the United Kingdom, the Liberal-Democrats have consistently been the most pro-European 
party since 1984: judging by the scores of 6.63 and 6.62 respectively, this party is strongly 
in favour of European integration. The Conservatives have hardened their stance on Europe, 
becoming an outspokenly Eurosceptic party (2.15 in 1999). Finally, the Labour party, starting 
from a rather neutral position, has recently receded somewhat from its Euro-enthusiasm of 
1992. Together with this drop, the salience of the issue for Labour has also gone down. In 
contrast, we fi nd that the Tories and the LDP have gradually adopted Europe as one of their 
most important issues. Parties in the Netherlands tend to agree on a pro-Europe position: the 
mutual differences are marginal. Over time, the VVD becomes less positive about Europe, but 
its score of 5.45 is still far away from Euroscepticism. In 1999, D66 takes over from the CDA 
as the most pro-European party. Although we can see an increase between 1984 and 1999, 
salience is still low for all parties: only in 1999 the VVD reaches a score of 3.00, meaning that 
the issue is ʻimportantʼ. 
All in all, these fi gures confi rm the thesis of Hooghe et al. (2002) that parties in the 
political centre tend to converge towards a pro-Europe position, whereas opposition to Europe 
is located at both extremes of political spectrum. Having said that, it is also clear that the 
British situation does not fi t entirely into this picture: the Tories are more Eurosceptic than 
might be expected. Second, these fi gures suggest that the potential for party competition over 
the European issue is higher in the UK. In the Netherlands, salience is low and the range of 
opinions is very small. In the UK, party positions differ radically and the EU issue is more 
salient too. 
***
Before proceeding to the analysis of the party programmes more in detail, I will fi rst make some 
short remarks on those references to Europe that are not included in the threefold classifi cation. 
Here we are dealing fi rst of all with references that do not present a particular vision on Europe 
or European policy, but rather position oneʼs own country within the Union. To illustrate this, 
two examples from British programmes: 
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ʻThe UK is ninth per head of population among European nations for asylum applications  ʼ(Labour 
2001, p. 34) 
ʻBritain has the highest road user taxes in Europe and the worst traffi c jams  ʼ(Conservatives 2001, p. 
38)
In other words, many parties use the comparison with other countries in the EU, as an 
underpinning for their policy proposals. This kind of ʻbenchmarking  ʼcan be very useful for 
party competition.
The second group concerns those statements that do not refl ect the opinion of a party on 
certain matters. These can be ʻ factual  ʼremarks, in which parties merely provide dates or fi gures 
related to the EU, e.g. that the EU consists of 15 member states and may expand to include 25 
in the near future. The other situation is where parties make ʻmoral  ʼstatements, such as: ʻthe 
EU has brought peace and prosperityʼ. Although these references deal with Europe, they can 
not be fi tted into one of the categories, because they do not really refl ect a party position5.  
5.1 United Kingdom 2001: in Europe, not run by Europe 
There is one guiding principle for the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats alike 
in their positioning vis-à-vis Europe: the British national interest. Although it is formulated in 
somewhat different ways, the recurring idea in all three documents is that European integration 
has to be a process led by Britain and which is good for Britain. Moreover, all parties share the 
idea that Britain is an important world player. However, how can this national interest best be 
brought about? This is where ideas go in very different directions: whereas the Conservatives 
state that the national interest is best protected by abstaining from further European co-
operation, Labour and the Liberal-Democrats believe they can serve the national interest by 
actively participating in Europe. 
The central message of Labourʼs EU policy is captured in its ten goals for 2010: ʻ British 
ideas leading a reformed and enlarged Europe  ʼ(p. 2). The Labour aspiration is for Britain to be 
both a leader in Europe and an important world player, closely allied with the USA. Therefore, 
Britain cannot afford to turn away from Europe. Actually, more or less the same image is 
put forward by the Conservatives, who want to ʻlead the debate in Europe about its future, 
promoting our own clear and positive visionʼ. However, their aim is to be ʻin Europe, not run 
by Europe  ʼ(p.30). Ironically, the LDPʼs conclusion is that ʻneither Conservative nor Labour 
governments have made the most of Britainʼs potential as a core member of the EU  ʼ(p. 48).
* Policy and institutions
Interestingly, the Conservatives  ʼprogramme seems more moderate than their public stance and 
their Eurosceptic image (cf. table 1 above) would suggest. Although the Conservatives insist 
on keeping the pound and maintaining the national veto, they do not entirely reject European 
integration:
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ʻThe alternative is a Europe of nations coming together in different combinations for different 
purposes and to differing extents. In other words, a network Europe.  ʼ(…) At the same time, we are 
willing to support the principle of ʻreinforced co-operation  ʼin Europe, under which small groups of 
countries can become more closely integrated if they wish to do so, providing it does not damage 
Britain sʼ national interests.  ʼ(p. 29, my italics) 
In addition, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 (including Cyprus) is welcomed. In other areas 
the programme does show a Eurosceptic view: the Nice treaty has to be renegotiated, and a law 
on ʻ reserved powers  ʼis suggested, to make sure that the will of Parliament is not superseded by 
EU law. Also, the Tories aspire to maintain the national veto on European legislation and they 
want the EU to cut the budget by abandoning ʻill-considered programmes  ʼ(p.30).
In other words, the Conservatives do not want to keep other countries from co-operating 
more closely, but they prefer to stay where they are. The picture presented in the Conservatives  ʼ
programme is one of a ʻfl exible  ʼEurope, or a Europe of several speeds, in which countries can 
choose to intensify their co-operation in certain areas and to preserve other areas in national 
hands. This almost sounds like a very modern conception of European integration: it reminds 
us of ʻnew governance  ʼ (cf. Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999) or Schmitterʼs (1996) model 
of ʻcondominioʼ, in which territory and function can be variable and dispersed. In political 
practice, it will probably be more like a continuation and confi rmation of the ʻopting out  ʼ
position Britain has taken in the past. Examples of this policy include the initial refusal to sign 
the Social Charter of the Maastricht Treaty and the decision not to join the Euro. 
Labour promotes an active engagement in Europe, but they make it clear that national 
governments should be ʻin the driving seatʼ, which implies that  
ʻ(…) national governments should be seen to be setting the agenda of the EU, with the European 
Council setting the EUʼs priorities, a strong independent Commission ensuring that the European 
interest is heard and enforced, and an effective European Parliament improving draft legislation and 
holding the Commission to account  ʼ(p.38)
The prospect of the EU developing into a ʻUnited States of Europe  ʼis not supported, but the 
EU should consist of a ʻunique blend of intergovermental co-operation where possible and 
integration where necessaryʼ. Moreover, the main goal for Europe is to become ʻthe most 
competitive knowledge-based economy in the worldʼ. The benefi ts of trade and business are 
mentioned several times to justify Britainʼs involvement in the EU. Finally, Labour hints at 
some kind of European social model, although it remains unclear in what kind of European co-
operation this policy on the reform of welfare states and the advancement of social inclusion 
is to be accomplished.
In contrast to the more general points put forward by the Conservatives and Labour, 
the LDP has a more detailed and coherent set of ideas concerning EU institutions. First, they 
present an agenda for reform, aimed at increasing the role of citizens:
ʻWe want a Europe where the interests of people, not bureaucrats, come fi rst; a Europe that seeks to 
empower people, not impose upon them; an where European institutions concentrate on what they 
do best.  ʼ(p.48)
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Most of the actual measures have to do with the role and function of European bodies. Next 
to the general aim of making EU policy making more transparent, the LDP pledges for 
accountability of the Commission - including a ʻState of the Union  ʼspeech by the President - 
openness of the European Central Bank and an increasing effectiveness of EU regulation. The 
veto is to be maintained in areas of ʻvital interest  ʼ for Britain, such as defence, tax matters 
and social security. This listing is quite extensive, comparable to that of Labour, although 
this party uses a more broad formulation linked to ʻmatters of national sovereigntyʼ. To end 
with, the LDP supports a Common Foreign and Security Policy which is ʻconsistent with our 
membership of NATOʼ.
* Transfer of policy making
In this category, the goal of the Conservatives is straightforward: no further transfers of power 
ʻfrom Westminster to Brussels  ʼ (p.28). The big issue here is the Conservatives  ʼ opposition 
to the Euro and their determination to keep the pound. This position obviously implies that 
there is no reference whatsoever to policy areas that might better be taken to the European 
level. Inversely, there is also no clear agenda which policy should be regained by the British 
government. The one exception concerns the Common Agricultural Policy, which the Tories 
want to renegotiate so that the national governments are in charge again.
Again, it is the LDP which refers to Europe in the most detailed and elaborated way. In 
particular, the possibilities for ʻ Green Action  ʼare acknowledged. The LDP suggests further EU 
policy for the reduction of energy use, air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, 
further police co-operation within Europol is advanced. There is also a more fundamental 
consideration of the division of competences, which is part of the so-called ʻpriorities in 
Europeʼ: 
ʻEstablish a Constitution for the European Union to defi ne and limit the powers of the EU ensuring 
that decisions are made at the most appropriate level. It would set out the roles, responsibilities 
and power of EU institutions in relation to member states. (…) A standing scrutiny committee in 
the European Parliament should be established to ensure that EU proposals meet the criteria of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  ʼ(p.48-9)
Labour proposes a similar idea, although they suggest an Intergovernmental Conference 
to address the issue of ʻwhat should and what should not be done at the European level  ʼ(p.38). 
Next to that, a second chamber of the European Parliament, consisting of members of national 
parliaments, should keep an eye on the division of competences. The aims of Labour regarding 
the transfer of decision making to the EU level are rather modest. In most cases, they concern 
rather technical measures, such as patents for innovation. The fi rst exception is defence 
policy, where Labour advances a European Defence Initiative, which allows EU military 
operation outside NATO. The second concerns the hotly debated topic of joining the Euro: the 
formulation is extremely cautious, and membership will depend on public assent.  
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* Opportunities and constraints
In this category, the ʻsplendid isolation  ʼ of the Conservatives is most striking. There is no 
reference at all to the restrictions imposed by Europe on national policy. The only formulation 
we can fi nd is about the implementation of EU law: 
ʻThe next Conservative Government will not enforce European regulation any sooner or more 
zealously than other countries.  ʼ(p.37)
Labour has a comparable lack of attention for the effects of EU policy. The only reference to 
be found concerns European funding for tourism, which would be particularly helpful for the 
impoverished seaside resorts.
The LDP refers to anti-discrimination law and the protection of privacy thanks to EU 
legislation, and welcomes the incorporation of this regulation in UK law. But, fairly similar to 
the Tories, it wishes to stop 
ʻthe practice of ʻgoldplating  ʼ EU regulations, whereby the UK government unnecessarily adds 
requirements to minimum EU standards  ʼ(p.49)
Finally, the programme speaks of improving the scrutiny of national parliaments: ministers, 
including the PM, will have to give evidence before the European Affairs Committee. This 
may also improve the control over the effects of EU regulation on British politics. 
* Synopsis
Table 3 gives a sketchy overview of the coverage of the three categories in the programmes 
of the British parties. It will come as no surprise that the LDP scores highest overall. This 
programme has the most extensive and detailed coverage on all aspects of Europeanisation. 
Both Labour and the Tories directly compete with each other on the European issue in the fi rst 
and second category. The main aim is to show what is wrong about the otherʼs European policy. 
Whereas the Conservatives claim that the Labour government has ʻlost confi dence in our 
ability to govern ourselves  ʼand is ʻtaking us down a route  ʼwhich leads to a ʻfully integrated 
superstate  ʼ(p.29), Labourʼs reproach is equally clear:
ʻSo we chose to engage constructively in Europe, not to shout abuse from the sidelines. (…) Standing 
up for Britain means fi ghting for Britainʼs interests in Europe, not leaving Europe - which threatens 
our national interest.  ʼ(p.4-5)
Table 3. Coverage of EU issues, United Kingdom 
Policy and institutions Transfer of decision making Opportunities and 
constraints
LAB High Medium Low
TORY High Low Low
LDP High Medium Medium
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Whereas clear views can be found on EU policy and institutions, all three parties - with the 
partial exception of the Liberal Democrats - pay far less attention to the second and third 
category. This is especially the case when we look at the ʻopportunities and constraintsʼ: it 
seems as if all parties suggest that there is still a lot of national policy autonomy left.
5.2 Netherlands 2002: indifference or lack of vision?
Altogether, the main parties in the Netherlands tend to be positive about European integration. 
Although critical remarks can sometimes be heard from the VVD, this is more of a latent 
and ʻirregular  ʼ Euroscepticism which does not show in their party programme. The slight 
differences are in line with the picture of table 1: CDA and D66 are most Euro-enthusiast, the 
PvdA follows at close distance. None of the parties presents the EU issue as an important one: 
the VVD in particular hardly mentions it. The PvdA has the most extensive coverage, but this 
is also due to the very large size of the programme as a whole.
Unlike in the United Kingdom, no guiding principle for EU policy can be distinguished. 
None of the parties speak of the EU in terms of the national interest. But it becomes clear when 
reading between the lines that one of the main reasons for supporting European integration is 
the economic benefi t for an open economy like the Netherlands. The drawback of a lack of 
vision and the fact that both the political and the public debate on Europe are practically non-
existent, is that most of the  programmes are rather superfi cial and uncommitted. The absence 
of a Eurosceptic challenger party makes most of the EU content rather predictable. 
* Policy and institutions
For the VVD, the main goal of European integration is to promote economic growth and free 
trade. Consequently, further co-operation, and the upcoming enlargement, has to be judged 
from this perspective. In terms of policy, the main proposals are the reform of agricultural policy 
and cuts in the budget for structural funds. The CFSP has to be improved within the context 
of NATO, which implies that the VVD is against a separate European military infrastructure. 
Second, the programme is very brief on EU institutions: it only contains very general remarks 
on the importance of transparency and openness and the usual statement about the need for 
enhancing the role of the European Parliament.
As could be seen in the example cited above, D66 makes an explicit choice for a federal 
Europe. It  has to be added that the programme does not tell us more about the desired type of 
federalism they propose or the time span in which this has to be achieved. Furthermore, the 
focus is on a reform of the Unionʼs internal structure. Among their measures are the evaluation 
of the structural funds, a radical change in agricultural policy and an end to money ʻfl owing 
around  ʼthrough national and European bureaucratic channels. According to D66, Europe has 
to mean more than just ʻone currencyʼ: democratisation should be one the main goals. Their 
proposals are: direct election of the Commission President, budgetary rights and the right of 
initiative for the Parliament, plus the right to dismiss individual Commission members. 
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The PvdA emphasises the need for more democracy in the EU, and the involvement of 
citizens in EU politics. Most of the specifi c measures to attain these goals concern an increasing 
role for the European Parliament. One of these measures is the election of the Commission 
President by the EP, which in turn will ʻstrengthen the position of the European Commission 
vis-à-vis national governmentsʼ. Next to that, the introduction of European candidate lists, 
EU-wide referenda and a kind of European ʻpoldermodel  ʼare proposed. In other words, the 
PvdA wishes to switch the balance from intergovernmentalism to the community method, from 
national governments to Commission and Parliament. This also implies that national vetoes 
should be limited: 
ʻ(The veto) was a reasonable instrument to give self-confi dence to six founding countries. In a Union 
of fi fteen countries it has become a serious hindrance. In other words, when less and less is decided 
nationally and more and more in commonality, the European institutions should be organised less 
along national lines and more along community lines.  ʼ(p.65) 
Turning to EU policy, the PvdA - like most of the other parties - wishes a reform of the CAP. 
Moreover, the development of a knowledge society and the role of the EU (Commission) as a 
global actor are supported. 
In the CDA programme, Europe is described as a ʻfederal union of statesʼ, based on 
core values such as justice and solidarity: its democratic character is of vital importance. For 
that purpose, the European Parliament obtains the right to dismiss individual Commissioners 
and the areas for which co-decision applies, have to be expanded. But the focus is on the 
Commission and its right to initiate policy making in all three pillars. The main policy choices 
concern the reform of agriculture towards income subsidy, the use of structural funds in the 
light of enlargement and the reinforcement of the internal market. 
* Transfer of decision making
The VVD is not in favour of formally establishing the division of competences, since European 
integration is considered a ʻ dynamic process  ʼwhich can not be based on a certain ʻ fi nal modelʼ. 
A  three step approach is outlined to deal with the question as to which tasks can be transferred 
to the EU level:
a) does this measure contribute to the promotion of the free movement of persons, goods, services or 
capital? b) does this measure concern a cross-border problem which cannot be solved at the national 
level? c) does European co-operation contribute to economies of scale benefi ts? (p.47)
As a result, the VVD only supports additional EU involvement in very specifi c policy areas. 
These include EU-wide liberalisation of gas and electricity supply and harmonisation of 
the regulation on technological development. Also, the need for a common EU asylum and 
immigration policy is put forward. According to D66, the European Constitution has to 
formalise the division between national sovereignty and European competences. Further 
European regulation is welcomed in the areas of defence and security, asylum policy, and 
environment.  
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Subsidiarity is the keyword for the CDA to achieve a 
ʻ(…) clear and concise demarcation of competences and tasks of the European Union and its member 
states.  ʼ(p.25)
The Christian Democrats argue for an increasing role for the EU in several areas. To name a 
few: the approach of cross border crime, the need for European criminal law, and reduction of 
CO2 emissions. Furthermore, there is a demand for a number of more specifi c and sometimes 
technical EU regulations.  
The PvdA follows the CDA when it comes to the division of competences: 
ʻOf course, this does not mean that all decisions should be made at the European level. On the 
contrary, our point of departure will be: what can be arranged at the national, regional or local level, 
will not be done by the European Union (the principle of subsidiarity) (…) Also, a better balance 
between national governments and the European Union is required  ʼ(p.65).
Moreover, a European intervention army has to be built up, in close co-operation with NATO 
and the UN. Other policy areas in which European competence should increase include 
harmonisation of tax regimes, defence and security policy, legalisation of soft drugs (!) and 
development aid. Like the Labour Party, the PvdA is very cautious when it comes to social 
policy at the EU level.
* Opportunities and constraints
In the VVD programme, which is rather modest in its coverage of EU issues as it is, the third 
category plays practically no role. The only two references concern European tender rules that 
should not be violated, and how the protection of animals against diseases has to be in line 
with EU legislation. The same can be said of D66, who pay even less attention to the effect of 
Europe. Their programme refers to the role of the Secretary of State in co-ordinating ʻEuropeʼ, 
a statement that gets no further explication.   
This need for co-ordination is recognised by the CDA as well, but this party adds a 
number of other issues. On several occasions, the CDA points at the fact that national legislation 
has to conform to EU laws. National security policy has to fi t within the framework of the EU 
and NATO, and the sickness scheme has to be adapted to EU principles of free movement of 
persons and the freedom of choice for the insurant.
In the PvdA programme the clearest statements about European impact can be found, 
summarised as follows:
ʻEurope has become interior and is going to be even more so in the future  ʼ(p.64)  
The PvdA alludes to the consequences of enlargement for the national labour market, and the 
impact of imports from the EU for food safety. Moreover, there is a focus on the public debate 
about Europe, which the PvdA aims to stimulate.
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* Synopsis
Table 4. Coverage of EU issues, the Netherlands
Policy and institutions Transfer of decision making Opportunities and constraints
PvdA High Medium Medium
CDA High Medium Low
VVD Medium Low Low
D66 High Medium Low
Table 4 depicts the coverage of the three categories by the Dutch parties. It is striking that the 
third category scores low in all cases, except for the PvdA. Again, parties do not explicitly 
mention the context in which national policy is made. Overall, the VVD seems least interested 
in EU affairs, whereas the programme also shows a certain euroscepticism. Both CDA and 
D66 present themselves as pro-European parties and emphasise the federal character of the 
EU. Finally, the PvdA proposes an increasing role for the community method, at the expense of 
intergovernmental decision making. But the overall picture is that the EU is not a salient issue 
and that competition over EU policy hardly takes place. 
5.3 Europeanisation comparatively speaking
First of all, the fact that we have found references in all three categories hints at a certain 
congruence between the academic and the political notion(s) of Europeanisation. Then 
again, the third category  ʻopportunities and constraintsʼ, which corresponds to the common 
understanding of Europeanisation,  is clearly underrepresented. It seems as if parties are 
unwilling to admit that their room to manoeuvre has been seriously reduced over the last fi fteen 
years6.
The overview presented above offers some noteworthy insights. First, it is interesting 
to observe the differences between the Netherlands and the UK, specifi cally when it comes to 
the extent to which Europe has become an integral part of the programme, but also in the type 
of references to Europe. To begin with, Europe has been far more politicised in the UK, which 
in turn leads to clearer statements on the architecture of the EU political system and the way in 
which national interests can be served in the EU. The third category is practically absent in the 
UK – showing the ʻself-confi dence  ʼof particularly Labour and the Conservatives. This may 
represent the difference between large and  small countries: the ʻworld leader  ʼclaims of these 
parties sharply contrast with the modest attitude of Dutch parties. 
Second, there are some remarkable parallels. The lionʼs share of all references deal with 
EU policy and institutions: some parties even present a very detailed view on the role of the 
various EU bodies, which is comparable to what other parties present in their Euro manifestos. 
In addition, almost all parties somehow deal with the division of competences: either through 
the application of the subsidiarity principle or through a more formal Kompetenzkatalog. 
Finally, there is a number of issues where basically all parties wish to intensify European co-
16 17
operation: the fi ght against crime, environmental measures and defence and security. To be 
sure, the exact policy proposals may vary substantially, but there is a shared feeling that the EU 
level is more appropriate for regulation.    
6. Discussion
Europeanisation has become a buzzword in the literature on European integration. As I have 
briefl y explained, this is not unproblematic, since it has led to a lot of conceptual confusion. 
Europeanisation has been described both as a process of intensifying integration - the emergence 
of rules and norms at the European level - and as the domestic impact of EU regulation. I have 
followed the mainstream approach, which is the latter version, by looking at the way in which 
ʻEurope hits homeʼ. Subsequently, I have argued that the effect of EU integration on political 
parties has been somewhat overlooked in the literature hitherto and therefore deserves further 
attention. This paper has focused on the way in which party programmes display a certain 
level of Europeanisation. Due to the fact that the literature on this topic is relatively sparse, no 
mechanisms or logics of change comparable to the ʻgoodness of fi t  ʼhave been established as 
yet. In other words, this part of the Europeanisation literature is still in the second, exploratory 
phase (cf. section 2). My contribution has been to come up with a threefold categorisation to 
map adaptation of national party programmes.
I have presented the differences between the Europeanisation of programmes in two 
countries, assuming that national context matters, and this turned out to be the case. For that 
reason, I have not paid explicit attention to the differences between parties. This might be an 
interesting next step for research. To give one example: there is quite some variation between 
the Dutch (PvdA) and the British Labour Party, both members of the Social Democratic party 
family. Whereas Labour emphasises the role of national governments and the national veto, 
the PvdA propounds a larger role for Commission and Parliament and an increasing use of 
qualifi ed majorities. As a result, the PvdA is also less reluctant than Labour to transfer several 
policy areas to the EU level.  
Mair (2000; 2002) argues that political parties engage in the wrong debate at both the 
national and the European level. On the hand, European parties focus on changes in European 
institutions, although their capacity to achieve change is very limited. In particular, Treaty 
changes are discussed mainly in national parliaments, which have to ratify them. On the other 
hand, national parties continue to discuss all kinds of policy issues, which are only to a limited 
extent decided upon at the national level. Most of the rules which guide our every day life are 
made in Brussels and not in the national capitals. Mair suggests that European parties should 
focus more on day-to-day policy, whereas national parties would shift their attention to the 
architecture of the EU. 
To what extent does the analysis confi rm or refute this argument? Since I have focused 
on national parties, I can only take up that part of the argument. First, it is remarkable that 
most of the parties hardly mention European infl uence, even in those areas where it is obvious 
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that the EU sets the conditions for national policy. Second, it shows that most of the European 
references have to do with the policy and institutions of the EU. In other words, although 
national parties continue to focus on day-to-day policy, perhaps ignoring too often the EU 
context, their main attention for Europe is in the proper direction. 
It can be seen from various studies that parties come to pay more attention to the 
European Union and that internal dissent is growing. It also turns out that parties themselves 
consider the EU issue more important. Finally, different forms of Europeanisation have found 
their way into the party programmes, as has been demonstrated in the analysis presented 
above. However, does this actually make any difference for party competition and for the 
relation between parties and voters? This is were citizens (voters) come in: e.g. which is 
the public opinion about Europe? In the Netherlands we fi nd a much more positive attitude 
towards European integration than in the United Kingdom, judging from the results of the 
bi-annual Eurobarometer. On the other hand, this ʻpermissive consensus  ʼ may also lead to 
a lack of interest in EU issues and consequently a low profi le public debate. For parties, it 
is not very rewarding to emphasise European policy in their competition with other parties. 
In sum: parties have to challenge each other and this ʻmanifestation of a confl ict of interest 
between politicians  ʼ(Laver and Hunt 1992: 43) has to be recognised and appreciated by voters. 
Therefore, establishing party positions is not enough. These fi ndings should be linked to data 
about the contents of election campaigns and parliamentary debates, to know which is the 
impact on electoral and policy competition.  
Finally, it seems worthwhile to study other aspects of party life as well, as Ladrech 
(2002) has argued convincingly. This paper has considered the impact the EU has on the 
programme of parties and briefl y touched upon the aspect of party competition. But European 
integration may also have an impact on party organisation. Apart from some evident matters, 
such as selecting candidates and drawing up a European manifesto, there are more fundamental 
questions about the role of EU specialists (including MEPs) within the party or the extent 
of transnational party activity and national control over MEPs. In many cases, European 
integration will be an additional factor, possibly enhancing developments that were already 
taking place (cf. Ladrech 1999). But it will turn out to be a factor that cannot be ignored. To a 
large extent, the abundant literature on party change or party decline has turned a blind eye to 
European infl uences until now. It is about time to take up the gauntlet of this research agenda. 
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Notes
1 Interestingly, some recent articles have pointed at the need to re-incorporate the bottom-up perspective in 
Europeanisation literature (Beyers and Trondal 2002; Börzel 2003)
2 To be sure, the authors cited do not claim that their work falls within this literature.
3 A description of this project can be found at http://www.Euromanifestos.de
4 In addition, pro- or anti- Europe positions do not tell very much about the extent to which parties are 
Europeanised. Pro- EU parties are not by defi nition more Europeanised than anti-EU parties. Unfortunately, the 
literature so far has focused too narrowly on the issue of euroscepticism, whereas I seek to look at programmatic 
change in a broader perspective.
5 The latter example is perhaps a bit questionable, because it does refl ect a (very) positive statement about the EU, 
i.e. about what the EU has brought so far. However, what I mean to say is that it does not contain a concrete 
policy proposal or statement. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the issue of pro- or anti-EU is not my main 
concern.
6 More research is needed to understand why parties are so reluctant to admit their limited scope of policy action. 
My hunch would be that they have a self-interest not to portray themselves as weak actors with little infl uence, 
but there may be other factors as well.
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